Introduction
In this article we will revisit the classical distinction between illusory perception and veridical perception, in light of recent work in theoretical neurobiology. We outline theories in contemporary perceptual neuroscience sensory stimulus may support multiple conflicting interpretations if taken in isolation, one interpretation usually stands out as being 'optimal' once the context of the situation is taken into account. The computational details of precisely how this contextual information is acquired and used to guide perceptual inference remain the focus of lively debate in the field [4, [8] [9] [10] [11] .
Perceptual Inference and Illusions
In recent years perceptual neuroscience has focused on sensory illusions in an attempt to elucidate the mechanisms underlying perceptual inference. Illusions represent situations where our perception reliably and indomitably disagrees with the true nature of the raw sensory information [ 12 , p. 195] . Even with the knowledge that, say, the two lines are of equal length in the Müller-Lyer illusion ( fig. 1 a) , or that flanking luminance values are equal in the Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet effect ( fig. 1 b) , it is exceedingly difficult for most people to perceive these images in this 'veridical' manner.
Progress in the field of perceptual and computational neuroscience has shown that 'illusory' perceptual phenomena, far from representing failures in the perceptual apparatus, are explained by a theory of perceptual inference that uses contextual information and prior assumptions to constrain interpretations of sensory data [6, 12, 13] . Some of this work is briefly outlined here, with references to more comprehensive theoretical reviews.
Wholly Empirical Vision
In the 'wholly empirical' strategy, or Empirical Rank Theory (ERT), the subjective qualities of our perceptions are based on how the value of a given stimulus ranks against the cumulative distribution of previously experienced stimuli in the same context [6, 14] . For example, vertical lines of a given length appear longer than horizontal lines of the same length [15] ( fig. 1 c) . The ERT argues that this illusion arises because in the summed evidence from past experience of natural scenes horizontal lines are generally longer than vertical lines, so for two lines of a given length the horizontal line ranks lower with respect to all other perceived horizontal lines (and is thus perceived as shorter) than the vertical line. ERT has been used to explain a number of visual illusions using both psychophysical paradigms [16, 17] and computational modelling based on analysis of statistical regularities in natural scenes [18] [19] [20] . ERT has also been used to reproduce electrophysiological properties of early visual neurons in artificial neurons [21] . These studies have been nicely reviewed elsewhere [6, 11, 14] . Although it is natural for us to think of perception as making inferences about the 'real world', it is important to note that ERT makes no appeal to a world of 'hidden causes' that lies behind sensory data [4] and is hence said to be 'wholly empirical' [14] .
Bayesian Perception
Alternatively, it has been argued that the brain does maintain and update a representation of the world, which is used to guide perceptual inference about the 'hidden causes' underlying sensory information [1, 2, 9] . This reasoning begins by acknowledging that perception is best explained by an inferential process that takes into account both current sensory data and prior knowledge (or expectation) about the state of the world, in a manner which follows the laws of Bayesian inference [3, 22] . In other words, where the current sensory data and prior expectation (both represented as probability distributions over 'real-world causes') are at odds, the Bayes-optimal perceptual inference is the precision-weighted combination of the competing evidence (where precision is the inverse variance of the said distributions and is roughly equivalent to the confidence the observer has in the information [9] ). Bayesian perceptual inference thus uses prior expectations to constrain the interpretation of incoming sensory data. Intriguingly, non-invasive functional neuroimaging experiments in humans support the notion that featurespecific perceptual expectations (set up by prior experience) can modify cortical responses to incoming sensory signals at multiple nodes of the sensory processing hierarchy [7, [23] [24] [25] . Despite its appeal, exact Bayesian inference is computationally expensive [1] , and a challenge has been to show how the brain may implement this strategy in a biologically plausible manner [11] .
Hierarchical Predictive Coding
One popular and neurobiologically plausible implementation of Bayesian perceptual inference, outlined by Friston [1, 9] and colleagues, is hierarchical predictive coding. Here perception, based on empirical Bayesian inference, occurs in a distributed fashion in reciprocally linked hierarchical sensory processing circuits.
At the heart of hierarchical predictive coding is the notion that the brain maintains dynamic representations of the world, housed in the synaptic connections of hierarchical sensory processing circuits [1] . These representations become progressively more abstract at higher levels of the processing hierarchy, representing the 'real-world causes' giving rise to sensory signals at the highest hierarchical levels [2] . Based on this internal world model the brain is able to make online predictions about the state that the world is in, which are transformed into predicted incoming sensory signals by learned internal 'generative' models. Predicted sensory signals cascade down the neuronal hierarchy, acting as 'prior' sensory probabilities (or expectations) for lower regions, thus constraining the interpretation of incoming sensory signals.
If there is a good match between the 'top-down' prior probability and the 'bottom-up' sensory data, the current representation of the state of the world is reinforced. If there is a mismatch, and the precision of the sensory information is high, a 'prediction error' signal drives an updating of the brain's current world model, which is subsequently retested against the real-world data. The iterative process of matching 'top-down' predictions to 'bottom-up' sensory signals arrives at a multimodal internal representation of the state of the world that is internally coherent and thought to contain abstract object representations [2] . This final representation (formally, a 'posterior probability'), arrived at through an inversion of the generative model [9] , is equivalent to a Bayes-optimal (perceptual) inference about the 'real-world' source of the sensory data. Eloquent formal mathematical treatments of this proposal are outlined elsewhere [1, 7, 9] .
Hierarchical predictive coding models of perception have been successfully used to explain visual [13] and somatosensory [26] illusions. Brown and Friston [13] have recently applied the model to the Cornsweet illusion ( fig. 1 b) , in contrast to the wholly empirical treatment of the illusion [16] . Object luminance, registered by the retina, is created by the interaction between object illumination and reflectance. In the Cornsweet illusion the luminance of the peripheral regions on the left and the right are equal, but the perceived brightness is not. Brown and Friston created a simulated Bayesian observer using a hierarchical implementation of the empirical Bayes model equipped with simple prior beliefs that relate to the ways illuminance and reflectance patterns dynamically change both spatially and temporally. Their simulated observer not only 'perceived' the illusory left-right brightness difference of the illusion, but also perceived Mach bands (illusory paracentral vertical bands). The simulated observer's perception of the Cornsweet and Mach band illusions was sensitive to changes in contrast precision in a manner that was qualitatively similar to human subjects.
Illusions and Psychopathology
So far we have argued that low-level perceptual illusions can shed light on the computational principles underlying everyday perception. These illusions, paradigmatic of those investigated by perceptual neuroscience, involve perceptual experience that reliably and systematically disagrees with the 'true' nature of the physical stimulus, despite the fact that the observer is calm and attentive. By contrast, the definition of the word 'illusion' in descriptive psychopathology, a cornerstone of clinical psychiatry [27] , is subtly different [ 28 , p. 16] .
Karl Jaspers, a founder of descriptive psychopathology, defined an illusion as a form of 'false perception', in which 'fresh, unreal objects' are perceived when external sensory stimuli are combined with 'transposing (or distorting) elements' [ 29 , p. 64] . Two illustrative examples, taken from Jaspers' canonical text, include 'illusions due to affect' (e.g. 'A melancholic patient, beset by fears of being killed [who] may take clothes hanging on the wall for a corpse') and 'illusions due to inattentiveness' (e.g. ' We overlook misprints in a book and complete the meaning correctly according to context') [ 29 , p. 65] . Here, the em-phasis is on the false perception of meaningful 'objects' in the natural world (i.e. a corpse or a word), in contrast to the illusory stimuli of contemporary perceptual neuroscience, which are designed to elicit distorted perceptions of isolated basic features of the visual scene (e.g. luminance and length) [12] .
The illusions described by descriptive psychopathology arise when an observer has a high prior expectation about the state of the world, and is confronted with noisy and ambiguous incoming sensory data. The observer's prior expectation about the state of the world may be informed by the semantic context of a situation (in what have come to be termed 'completion illusions'), the observer's current emotional state [30] (in 'affect illusions') or active imaginative processes acting upon inherently ambiguous sensory data (in 'pareidolic illusions') [28, 29, 31, 32] . Sensory data may be 'naturally ambiguous' (for example patterns of shadow in cloud formations or a poorly lit visual scene) or may be ambiguous due to inadequate deployment of attention by the observer.
Although this clinical subdivision of illusions [28, 29, 31, 32] may seem alien to some, we argue that psychopathological illusions that arise in the context of high sensory noise (often caused by low attention) and high prior expectation can be easily accommodated by the hierarchical predictive coding model of perceptual inference. When the prior expectation about the state of the world disagrees with the incoming sensory data, the resulting posterior probability on the real-world causes giving rise to sensory data lies between these hypotheses. In the case of psychopathological illusions, the prior expectation is held very confidently (formally, the prior distribution on causes has high precision), perhaps owing to a pathological mental state such as fear or paranoia, leading to a high subjective expectation of threatening objects. Conversely, the sensory data is noisy or poorly attended to (i.e. has low precision). Consequently the optimal perceptual inference about the real-world causes underlying the sensory data (i.e. posterior probability) will lie closer to the prior expectation. If an observer subsequently allocates more attention towards the sensory information, the precision of incoming sensory data increases and the resulting posterior probability becomes more 'veridical'. Therefore, the Bayesian model explicitly parameterizes expectation and attention in perceptual inference, and assigns them orthogonal roles [1, 2, 10] . The separable roles of expectation and attention in perceptual inference, along with discussions of their plausible neural correlates, have recently been reviewed elsewhere [10] .
Conclusions
The account of Bayesian perceptual inference outlined above is thus capable of explaining a number of features of everyday perception, low-level perceptual illusions and the illusory phenomena outlined in descriptive psychopathology. In all cases perceptual inference aims to arrive at the most likely representation of the world by taking into account prior expectations, incoming sensory signals, and the precision that both sources of information contain. Thus, it is not just illusory perception, but all perception that results from a combination of mental imagery with sensory stimuli [ 33 , p. 185] .
Despite the promising application of ERT to low-level perception and perceptual illusions, it does not easily lend itself to an understanding of object perception [11] , or how such perception is affected by states of low attention, heightened emotion or contextually driven semantic expectations. As these features are necessary for psychopathological illusions to occur, it is difficult to discuss these illusions within the context of wholly empirical strategies of perception. These illusions instead require an account of how the brain makes rich, context-dependent predictions about the state that the world is in, and tests these predictions against incoming sensory data.
We have argued that the Bayesian account of perception is well placed to do this. Moreover, in this account the context and meaning of the perceptual scene are given primacy in the process of perceptual inference. Multimodal nodes high in the cortical hierarchy postulate internally coherent hierarchical representations of the state of the world, already pregnant with behavioral relevance and meaning for the organism, which are ready to be confirmed or refuted by incoming packets of sensory data [2] . This generative account of perception is consistent with the intuitions of phenomenological philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, who argued that we do not construct meaning from meaningless sensory information, but that in perception 'the whole is prior to the parts' [34] .
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